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Abstract 
We formulate a method to determine an equitable division of dairy farm partnership income 
when partners provide unequal amounts of capital, labor, and management and empirically 
estimate this relationship.  New York dairy farm financial data are used within fixed effects and 
random coefficient panel regression models to reveal a systematic division of dairy farm 
partnership income among operators’ labor, capital, and management while controlling for 
heterogeneity arising from differing herd size.  Results indicate that controlling for time and 
heterogeneity across farms due to herd size are important factors when dividing net farm income 
among unpaid factors of production.  Empirical estimates of allocating dairy farm partnership 
income to equity, operators’ labor, and management are presented. 
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In family farm succession planning there are two major decisions facing the family. The first is 
what family members should succeed in the management and ownership of the business. The 
second major decision is how to allocate the business income when these family members 
provide unequal amounts of equity, labor, and management to the business. And unequal 
amounts of contributions is the norm in agriculture as parents begin to provide less labor and 
management but still have a significant ownership of the business while they transfer the 
business to the next generation. This study addresses the dilemma of income allocation by 
estimating the earned returns to unpaid factors of production using a panel of dairy farms with 
various amounts of income, and unpaid factors of equity, labor, and management. Results 
suggest guide lines in separating farm income  for the family farm business. 
Although several forms of succession plans are possible, many farm families have their 
business structured as general or limited partnerships during the succession process, with the 
general partnership being the most common (Kay, Edwards, and Duffy 2004).1  This is 
especially true in dairy farming. According to the 2007 U.S. Agricultural Census approximately 
14.7% of businesses labeled with a NAICS classification code indicating dairy cattle and milk 
production had partnership listed as their legal form of organization (USDA 2009).2   
 Others have discussed the process of allocating farm partnership income to the unpaid 
factors of production.  In one study linear regression models were estimated to determine a 
systematic division of dairy income among the three unpaid factors of production: operators’ 
labor, capital, and management (Tauer 1997).  The results suggest income should be allocated to 
management after equity and unpaid labor have been reimbursed at their opportunity costs.  
Similarly, other studies suggest reimbursing one or more of the unpaid factors of production by 
the associated opportunity cost, then allocating the residual to the remaining unpaid factors 
 
 
 
 5 
(Hepp and Kelsey 1988; Thomas, Kunkel, and Dahl 1981).  However, the residual unpaid factors 
of production may be subject to excess gains or losses should income be high or low.  In 
addition, how management should be reimbursed when considering unpaid labor and capital 
poses a challenge.   
 The objective of this paper is to formulate a method to determine an equitable division of 
dairy farm partnership income when partners provide unequal amounts of capital, labor, and 
management and empirically estimate this relationship.  New York dairy farm financial data are 
used within fixed effects panel regression and random coefficient models to reveal a systematic 
division of dairy farm partnership income among operators’ labor, capital, and management 
while controlling for heterogeneity arising from differing herd size.   
 
Dividing Dairy Farm Partnership Income to Labor, Capital, and Management 
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) defines a partnership as “the relationship existing 
between two or more persons who join to carry on a trade or business.  Each person contributes 
money, property, labor or skill, and expects to share in the profits and losses of the business” 
(U.S. Dept. Treasury 2010b).  A partnership, defined within a partnership agreement, does not 
pay income tax but must file an annual information return to report the income, deductions, 
gains, losses, etc., from its operations.  In addition, a partnership may be liable for employment 
taxes and/or excise taxes (U.S. Dept. Treasury 2010a).  Instead of the partnership paying income 
taxes, the profits or losses are “passed through” to the partners who file individual tax returns 
that may include income taxes, self-employment taxes, and estimated taxes (U.S. Dept. Treasury 
2010b).  
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 Family members can be partners within a farm partnership provided the following 
requirement is met:  “If capital is a material income-producing factor, they acquired their capital 
interest in a bona fide transaction (even if by gift or purchase from another family member), 
actually own the partnership interest, and actually control the interest.”  (U.S. Dept. Treasury 
2008).3  Clearly, capital is material in farm partnerships.  Federal and state income tax laws 
allow for the disproportionate allocation of partnership income and expenses across the partners.  
Payments to a partner for services, use of property, or use of capital may be deductible by the 
partnership or treated as a method of income allocation, and land into one of three categories.  If 
the partnership has a partner acting in a nonpartner capacity then treatment of the payment to the 
partner are governed by Code Sec. 707(a) that appear as a partnership deduction reflecting fair 
market value compensation.  If the partnership has a partner acting as a partner, but without 
regard to partnership profits, then treatment of the payments are considered guaranteed payments 
governed by Code 707(c) that appear as a partnership deduction reflecting fair market value 
compensation.  If the partnership has a partner acting as a partner and payments are dependent on 
the level of partnership profits, the payments are first treated as a special allocation of income to 
the partner governed under Code Sec. 704 and then as a distribution of income governed under 
Code Sec. 731 that appear as a reduction in other partners’ income simultaneous with payee’s 
partner’s income, but may not necessarily reflect fair market value compensation (Ricketts and 
Tunnell 2006).          
 Usually, when unequal contributions are made, an allocation of returns is determined and 
made to either labor or capital which is subtracted from net income leaving the remaining 
residual income to be allocated to remaining unpaid factors of production such as management.  
For an example, we refer to the following IRS example:  “A father sold 50% of his business to 
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his son. The resulting partnership had a profit of $60,000. Capital is a material income-producing 
factor. The father performed services worth $24,000, which is reasonable compensation, and the 
son performed no services. The $24,000 must be allocated to the father as compensation. Of the 
remaining $36,000 of profit due to capital, at least 50%, or $18,000, must be allocated to the 
father since he owns a 50% capital interest. The son's share of partnership profit cannot be more 
than $18,000.” (U.S. Dept. Treasury 2008). 
 One problem with the income allocation scheme described above is that the residual 
factor of production may receive a windfall gain or loss quite different from its implied 
opportunity cost or contribution to the business.  In addition, a decision must be made whether to 
recognize and reimburse management. It is clear that there exists a relationship between farm 
financial performance and managerial ability (Gloy et. al. 2002; Fox et. al. 1993). This 
management may be separable or linked with labor and/or capital.  Any procedures outlined to 
remedy the income allocation problem will require an estimate of the opportunity costs or 
contribution of one or more of the unpaid factors of production.   
 
Methods to Determine an Equitable Division of Partnership Income to Factors of 
Production 
Gross farm income from the sale of output is allocated to the factors of production.  Profits differ 
from farm to farm due to several reasons including initial resource endowments, output prices, 
factor prices, farm efficiency, management, expectations, and risk preferences.  Ignoring 
expectations and risk preferences, profit-maximizing farms in the long run attempt to maximize 
the following objective function: 
(1)   ( ) ( ) ( )( ), Max  ,Lπ ∈= −xp w p q x c w q xℝ i  
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where M∈p ℝ is a strictly positive vector of output prices; ( )q x  represents output and is a vector 
valued function that includes a set of production functions dependent on the input vector 
L∈ ⊂x X ℝ ; ( )( ),c w q x  is a vector valued cost function that is dependent on input prices 
L∈w ℝ and output ( )q x  representing total input costs.4  Equation (1) can be satisfied if the first 
and second order conditions of profit maximization are met.5  If there exists free industry entry 
and exit, then profits will be driven to zero through the process of farm managers equating the 
value of marginal product of each output to the associated marginal cost, fully exhausting gross 
farm income.  The residual portion of income left from subtracting the total input costs 
( )( ),c w q x  from gross income as expenses consists of net income and unpaid factors of 
production that have not been reimbursed.  Thus, a measure of the total costs of the unpaid 
factors of production represented by r yi  may be used to reveal the returns or opportunity costs 
that the unpaid factors of production should receive to fully exhaust net farm income, where 
r represents a vector of prices or returns associated with the unpaid factors, and y represents a 
vector of quantities of the unpaid factors.  The unpaid factors of production for a farm 
partnership are operators’ labor, management, and capital in the farm business.  Each of these 
three unpaid factors of production receives a share of net farm income according to the following 
identity: 
(2)   
     *  *  
   *  
Net Farm Income Management Return Quantity Management wage Quantity Labor
Rate of Return Quantity Equtiy
= +
+
   
To implement equation (2), panel regression methods can be used to empirically estimate 
reimbursement rates for each of the three unpaid factors of production.  Specifically, the 
estimated coefficients on the quantities of management, labor, and equity would be the rates of 
return that each unpaid factor contributed to net farm income. 
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 The approach implemented within this paper to determine an equitable division of 
partnership income to the unpaid factors of production is through fixed effects and random 
coefficient panel regression models.  Fixed effects panel regression models are useful when 
determining an equitable division of partnership income to the unpaid factors of production as 
they are an effective tool at evaluating dynamic relationships between variables, and allow for 
the incorporation of relevant dependent and independent variables which may be of various 
forms.6  The general form of the panel regression model is described as 
(3)   ( )it it ity uµ ′= + +x β , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T,  
where ity represents the firm i, year t dependent variable, µ  represents an intercept term, it′x  
represents a row vector of independent variables for firm i, year t , β represents a column vector 
of coefficients, and  where itε represents an error term 
for firm i, year t which is desired to be distributed ( )20,N εσ .7  The other desired features of the 
panel regression model include (strict) exogeneity, non-autocorrelation, and achieving the full 
rank condition (Wooldridge 2002).  In addition, either balanced or unbalanced panels may be 
used for estimation purposes as unbalanced panels pose no estimation difficulties (Wooldridge 
2002), 
 Random coefficient models (RCM) are more general than fixed effects models in that 
they allow for parameter heterogeneity that can be modeled as stochastic variation across 
subjects or firms (Greene 2003; Swamy 1970).  Random coefficient models have been extended 
to accommodate panel data and can be described as  
 if fixed cross-section effects
 if fixed time effects
 if both
i it
it t it
i t it
u
γ ε
δ ε
γ δ ε
+

= +
 + +
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(4)    ( ) ( )it t it i i ity µ γ µ ε′= + + + +x β , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T,      
where ity represents the firm i, year t dependent variable, µ  represents an intercept term, tγ  
represents a time fixed effect, iµ  represents a random intercept term for firm i, it′x  represents a 
row vector of independent variables for firm i, year t , i i= +β β v  represents a column vector of 
unit coefficients, and itε represents an error term for firm i, year t which is desired to be 
distributed ( )20,N εσ .  RCM adjoins to equation (4) the assumption that the iβ  are all related and 
typically has ( ),i Nβ β Γ∼  where Γ is a matrix of variance and covariance terms to be estimated 
representing the degree of heterogeneity of the unit coefficients implying ( ),Nv 0 Γ∼ .  Thus, 
equation (4) can be rewritten as  
(5)    ( ) [ ]iit t it i it ity µ γ µ ε′ ′= + + + + +x β x v , i=1,…,N, t=1,…,T, 
where the term in brackets represents a complicated error term.  An important restrictive 
assumption of the RCM is that the stochastic process which generates iβ  is independent of the 
error process and is also uncorrelated with the vector of independent variables it′x ensuring 
the it′x are uncorrelated with the complicated error term.  The complication of the error term 
causes the conditions of the Gauss-Markov theorem to not hold, and therefore methods of 
Maximum Likelihood or other iterative methods must be used to obtain coefficient estimates.  
The other desired features of the model in equation (5) are the same as those for the panel model 
presented in equation (3) (Beck and Katz 2007).      
 
Data 
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The data used for the analysis are taken from the New York Dairy Farm Business Summary 
(DFBS) (Knoblauch et. al. 2009) which is collected by Cornell University.  An unbalanced panel 
of 230 multiple operator farms over the ten year period 1999-2008 was used for a total of 1,165 
observations.  An unbalanced panel was chosen in order to maintain the most representative 
sample as possible.  The 230 farms included within the analysis are full-time operations that 
primarily produce milk. 
 The four variables within the regression analysis include measures of income, equity, 
labor, and farm size.  Income and equity are presented in real terms by adjusting to base year 
2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (U.S. Dept. of Labor 2010).8  In addition, the 
real measures of income, equity, and the measure of labor are divided by the yearly average 
number of cows to permit farm comparison on a per cow basis.  Summary statistics for the 
pooled ten year data of the four variables can be found in table 1. 
 The dependent variable for income is labeled itnfipcow representing real net farm income 
per cow for firm i, year t.  Net farm income is defined as accrual net farm income without 
appreciation and unpaid family labor removed (not owners).  Over the ten year period 1999-2008 
net farm income per cow averaged $564 per cow in real terms of base year 2008 dollars.  Net 
farm income per cow was notoriously variable across each of the ten years, ranging from $179 
per a cow in 2006 to $1,188 per cow in 2007.   In addition, net farm income per cow varied 
greatly across farms within each year, as four out of ten of the years the standard deviation in 
income was greater than the mean income.     
 Three independent variables are included within the regression analysis.  The 
independent variable for equity is labeled itequitypcow  representing real equity per cow for firm 
i, year t.  Equity is based on the average total farm assets market value and the average total farm 
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liabilities book value.9  Average equity per cow only slightly differed year to year and averaged 
$6,038 per cow over the ten year period, but did differ substantially between farms within each 
year.  The independent variable for labor is labeled itoplaborpcow  representing operators’ labor 
months per cow for firm i, year t.  Operators’ labor months is defined as the summation of the 
full time months worked by each operator, including up to six operators.  On average, the farms 
within this analysis had 30 full time months between 2.4 operators.  Operator labor months 
consistently dropped each year over the ten year period as farms acquired technology to replace 
labor.  The independent variable for farm size is labeled itlogcow  representing the logarithm of 
the average herd size for firm i, year t.10  The logarithm of the average herd size was included to 
account for the unobserved heterogeneity between farms.  Arguably, larger farms may require 
greater amounts of management ability and effort.  The average herd size per farm over the ten 
year period was 413 cows, and consistently increased each year from 295 cows per farm in 1999 
to 542 cows per farm in 2008.  Histograms of the pooled data for net farm income per cow, 
equity per cow, operators’ labor per cow, and the logarithm of average herd size can be found in 
figures 1 through 4 in the appendix I 
 
Empirical Results 
Two fixed effects panel regression models and two random coefficient panel regression models 
were formulated to determine estimates for an equitable division of dairy farm partnership 
income when partners provide unequal amounts of capital, labor, and management.   Panel 
regression models are useful when assessing the income allocation problem since annual 
variation in income implies the requirement for a dynamic decision process, which panel models 
are useful for considering sufficient longitudinal data are obtainable.  The choice of two fixed 
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effects panel models, one including both fixed time and firm effects and the other including only 
fixed firm effects, were chosen for comparison purposes to emphasize the importance of time 
effects.  Two random coefficient panel models were chosen to emphasize the stochastic nature of 
the returns to management across farms over the ten year period.  Further discussion of each 
model estimated follows.  
 
Fixed Effects Models 
 The two-way fixed effects panel regression equation estimated is defined as  
(6)   ( )0 3 1 2it i t it it it itnfipcow logcow equitypcow oplaborpcowβ δ γ β β β ε= + + + + + +  
where itε represents an error term for firm i in year t which is distributed ( )20,N εσ .  Within 
equation (6) 1β  represents the implied rate of return earned by equity per cow, and 2β  represents 
the implied return per month of operators’ labor per cow.   The parameters within the parenthesis 
represent the returns to management.  The intercept term 0β can be considered a portion of the 
residual return to management.  The fixed firm effects iδ represent returns to management related 
to differences between individual farms.  The fixed time effects tγ are considered to be exogenous 
bonuses to management in a given year.11  The coefficient on the variable itlogcow , 3β , represents 
the return to management associated with herd size.  Herd size is included to reduce 
heterogeneity across farms and is considered an important determinant when considering 
financial returns (Gloy et. al. 2002).  
 The one-way fixed effects panel regression equation estimated is the same as equation (6) 
excluding the fixed time effects tγ .  Note that 0β , iδ , or tγ  may be positive or negative depending 
on the farm, year, and whether fixed time effects are included.  Therefore, the returns to 
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management within the two-way fixed effects model in equation (6) would be the sum of three 
parameters plus the coefficient on itlogcow  multiplied by the logarithm of average herd size: 
i.e. 0 3i t itlogcowβ δ γ β+ + + .  The returns to management within the one-way fixed effects model 
would be the sum of two parameters plus the coefficient on itlogcow  multiplied by the logarithm 
of average herd size: i.e. 0 3i itlogcowβ δ β+ + .  Also note that for a given farm, or for a given farm 
within a given year, returns to management may be negative indicating a shortfall.  Results for 
the one- and two-way fixed effects panel regressions can be found in table 2.  The two-way fixed 
effects panel regression results within table 2 indicate that in the long run equity earns 
approximately 6 percent per year per cow, operator labor earns $259 per a given number of labor 
months per cow, and management earns the sum of $2,685 346*i t itlogcowδ γ− + + +  for a given 
firm in a given year, with all estimated t-ratios including the intercept but excluding operators 
labor being highly statistically significant.  A 6 percent return to equity may seem low; however, 
equity owners accrue any capital appreciation, which over the ten year period 1999-2008 
averaged approximately 10 percent per year in real terms for the 230 multiple owner farms 
within this study.  Given the two-way fixed effects regression results, on an average 413-cow 
farm over the ten years 1999-2008, the 12 month salary return would be $42,787.12  The average 
management return of a 413-cow farm would be $330 per year.13  The average number of 
operators per farm is 2.4, indicating a residual operator return of $138 per operator per year, or 
$42,925 per operator per year if the 12 month salary is included, and assuming management and 
operator are conducted by the same individual.  Therefore, on average the model indicates that 
the individuals conducting farm management will receive a low return; however when coupled 
with the returns to the operator the results are not unreasonable.  On most dairy farms it is very 
likely that the management and operator roles are coupled together.  In addition, the results 
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indicate that heterogeneity across farms due to herd size is an important factor when dividing net 
farm income among unpaid factors of production. 
 The F-statistic for no fixed effects based on 238 numerator, and 922 denominator degrees 
of freedom has a critical value of 8.18 indicating that together firm and year fixed effects are 
significant within the model.  Eight of the nine year fixed effects have large t-ratios indicating 
that income varies annually.  This is not unexpected as net farm income within the dairy industry 
is highly variable year to year.  The year fixed effects can be interpreted as bonuses to 
management.  Management differs across farms, as some managers are better than others 
financially and/or achieve higher efficiency.  In return for this management differential across 
farms, firm fixed effects represent an awarded premium or deducted penalty for differences in 
management across farms.  The firm fixed effects estimates range from -417 to 1,771 with 134 
significant. The fixed effects estimates distribution for the two-way fixed effects model can be 
found in appendix II, figure 1.  Overall, the two-way fixed effects model does a modest job by 
explaining 62 percent of the variation in net farm income per cow after adjusting for the number 
of coefficients estimated.  Also, inspection of the model residuals indicates that the desired 
properties associated with equation (6) described previously are satisfied.          
 The one-way fixed effects panel regression results within table 2 suggests that in the long 
run equity earns approximately 8 percent per year per cow, operator labor earns $13 per a given 
number of labor months per cow, and management earns the sum of $ 2,079 182*i logcowδ− + +  
for a given firm in any year.  The 8 percent return on equity differs from the 6 percent return 
estimated within the two-way fixed effects model as the year “bonuses” are all accrued to equity.  
On an average 413-cow farm of this data set over the ten years 1999-2008, the 12 month salary 
return would be $2,148.  The average management return for a 413-cow farm would be $191 per 
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year.  With an average of 2.4 operators per farm, indicating a management return of $80 per 
operator per year, or $2,228 per operator per year if the 12 month salary is included, and 
assuming management and operator are conducted by the same individual. 
 The F-statistic for no fixed effects based on 229 numerator, and 932 denominator degrees 
of freedom has a critical value of 2.55 indicating that firm fixed effects are significant within the 
model.  The firm fixed effects range from -299 to 2,144 with 172 significant estimates.  The 
fixed effects estimates distribution for the one-way fixed effects model can be found in appendix 
II, figure 2.  Compared to the two-way fixed effects model, the one-way fixed effects model is 
not as robust as only 28 percent of the variation in net farm income is explained after adjusting 
for the number of coefficients estimated.  Inspection of the model residuals indicates that the 
desired properties of equation (6) described previously are satisfied. 
 Overall, the results from the two-way and the one-way fixed effects models are 
qualitatively similar.  The returns to the unpaid factors of production depend on whether yearly 
“bonuses” are accrued to management or equity.  In addition, it is important to take into account 
heterogeneity across farms in a given year by controlling for herd size differences.   
Random Coefficient Models 
 Two random coefficient panel models were estimated to allow for stochastic variation 
across firms which are modeled through parameter heterogeneity.  Specifically, in addition to the 
estimation of coefficients on fixed effects unique random coefficients are estimated for each firm 
for the variables which are considered to include a random component across firms.  For the 
income allocation problem within this paper the following random coefficients model with 
random firm and herd size components is defined as  
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(7)  
( )
[ ]
3 1 2
3
it t it it it
i it it
nfipcow logcow equitypcow oplaborpcow
v logcow
µ γ β β β
µ ε
= + + + +
+ + +
 
where µ represents an intercept term and can be considered a portion of the residual return to 
management, tγ represents the fixed time effects which act as bonuses, 1β  represents the implied 
rate of return earned by equity per cow, 2β  represents the implied return per month of operators’ 
labor per cow, 3β  represents the return to management associated with herd size, and 
[ ]3i it itv logcowµ ε+ +  represents a complicated error term in which the firm effects and herd size 
variable have associated random components.  The difference between the random coefficients 
model and the fixed effects model described previously in equation (6) is that now management 
returns would be considered stochastic across farms and would be represented 
by ( ) ( )3 3i t itv logcowµ µ γ β+ + + + .  Arguably management returns would include stochastic 
components due to the heterogeneity across farms management abilities as some farms have 
better managers due to experience, education, efficiency attainment, etc.  Herd size may also 
randomly affect management as some managers are better at managing relatively small herds 
rather than large herds when considering the average size farm.  The random coefficients model 
with only stochastic firm effects differs in that the returns to management would only include 
( ) 3i t itlogcowµ µ γ β+ + + .14          
 Results for the two random coefficient panel regression models can be found in table 3.  
The random coefficient model including random intercept and herd size components indicates 
that in the long run equity earns approximately 5 percent per year per cow, operator labor earns 
$323 per a given number of labor months per cow, and management earns the sum of 
( )$778 $167 *i t i itv logcowµ γ− + + + +  for a given firm in a given year.  The distribution of the 
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estimates for the random firm effects and the random herd size effects can be found in appendix 
II, figure 4, and  figure 5.  The firm random effects range from -3,143 to 1,700 with 124 
significant at the 0.05α =  level.  The herd size random effects range from -307 to 475 with 77 
significant at the 0.05α =  level.   
 Given the results of the random coefficient estimates, on an average 413-cow farm over 
the ten years 1999-2008, the 12 month salary return would be $53,360.  The average 
management return of a 413-cow farm would be $214 per year.  The average number of 
operators per farm is 2.4, indicating a residual operator return of $89 per operator per year, or 
$53,449 per operator per year if the 12 month salary is included, and assuming management and 
operator are conducted by the same individual.  Model fit statistics for a model including a 
random coefficient for herd size indicate a -2 residual/restricted log likelihood of -17101.5 which 
is a significant improvement at the 0.01α =  level over the null model, and a model which only 
includes a random intercept term as indicated by likelihood ratio tests.15    
 The random coefficient model including only random intercept components indicates that 
in the long run equity earns approximately 5 percent per year per cow, operator labor earns $231 
per a given number of labor months per cow, and management earns the sum of 
$690 $153*i t itlogcowµ γ− + + +  for a given firm in a given year.  The distribution of the 
estimates for the random firm effects can be found in appendix II, figure 3.  The firm random 
effects range from -1,044 to 615 with 55 significant at the 0.05α =  level. 
 Given the results of the random coefficient estimates, on an average 413-cow farm over 
the ten years 1999-2008, the 12 month salary return would be $38,161.  The average 
management return of a 413-cow farm would be $311 per year.  The average number of 
operators per farm is 2.4, indicating a residual operator return of $130 per operator per year, or 
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$38,291 per operator per year if the 12 month salary is included, and assuming management and 
operator are conducted by the same individual.  Model fit statistics indicate a -2 
residual/restricted log likelihood of -17,121.2 which is a significant improvement at the 0.01α =  
level over the null model. 
 Both the fixed effects and random coefficients panel regression models were 
quantitatively and qualitatively similar and support the results found in Tauer 1997.  Also, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics, New York 
farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers’ earnings averaged $66,876 per year over the 
1999-2008 periods (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).  The results from the two-way fixed effects 
and both random coefficient panel models are quantitatively similar to the actual averages over 
the ten year period reinforcing the robustness of these models as tools to correctly specificity a 
division of income.   
 The question then becomes which model should be used to assess an equitable division of 
partnership income for a given farm, and how the income should be allocated among 
management, labor, and capital.  Arguably both types of models could be used, with the 
exception of the one-way fixed effects panel model, to assess the income allocation problem; 
however, someone using these models to reveal their implied opportunity cost should take into 
account their individual situation by deciding whether stochastic returns to management is an 
appropriate feature.  Likely, conclusions based on either type of model indicate that labor and 
equity should receive the majority of returns, with the residual being allocated to management.  
Since for most farms the operator and management roles are usually conducted by the same 
individual it is reasonable to allocate the residual after operators and equity is paid to 
management.  A reasonable approach supported by the empirical results is to assign a justifiable 
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opportunity rate and wage to both equity and labor and given the quantities of equity and labor 
determine the share of each to total opportunity cost. Those share percentages which sum to one 
can be used to allocate annual net income. This assumes that management is provided by both 
equity and labor holders. But deviations from this suggestion can also be justified based upon the 
empirical results.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Fixed effects and random coefficients panel regression models based on 230 New York dairies 
from 1999-2008 were estimated to determine an equitable division of dairy farm partnership 
income when partners provide unequal amounts of capital, labor, and management.  Both fixed 
effects and random coefficient models indicate the importance of the dynamic structure of the 
income allocation decision.  Fixed time effects in both types of models can be considered 
“bonuses”, and were highly significant in all models which included time effects.  Both types of 
models indicate that equity should receive an implied return of approximately 5 to 8 percent 
without accounting for capital appreciation.  The implied returns to labor ranged from $14 per 
cow to $323 per cow depending on the type of panel model specified.   The implied returns to 
management varied from $191 to $330 per year indicating, and are likely low considering that 
most farms have the operator and management roles conducted by the same individual.  Any 
shortfalls would be distributed across partners according to their ownership shares.  In addition, 
it is important to account for heterogeneity across farms by controlling for herd size differences. 
 Revealing implied opportunity costs through the use of fixed effects and random 
coefficients panel regression techniques proved useful when determining an equitable division of 
income among dairy farm partners.  The results of this analysis could be used to help guide dairy 
 
 
 
 21 
farm partners when facing the decision of how to allocate income when each partner makes 
unequal contributions.  The implied opportunity costs of the unpaid factors of production are 
guidelines to determining an income distribution plan among the partners within a partnership.  
Arguably labor and equity should receive the majority of returns, with the residual being 
allocated to management since most farms have the operator and management roles conducted 
by the same individual.  However, adjustments to returns should be made if the operator and the 
manager roles are conducted by different individuals. 
 The results of this analysis are based on a sample of New York dairy farms.  The same 
analysis performed on different data may yield different results, but the generality of the methods 
is applicable to all dairies.  The results of this analysis may be used as a guideline to determining 
an equitable division of farm income. Any income distribution plan between partners should be 
further investigated and agreed upon by each partner within the partnership agreement.        
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Footnotes. 
1 Our analysis focuses only on the general partnership as limited partners retain no managerial responsibilities. 
2 The NAICS code for the category “dairy cattle and milk production” is 11212. 
3 Capital is material is defined as:  “Capital is a material income-producing factor if a substantial part of the gross 
income of the business comes from the use of capital. Capital is ordinarily an income-producing factor if the 
operation of the business requires substantial inventories or investments in plants, machinery, or equipment.” (IRS 
2008). 
4 A constraint may be included within the profit maximization problem defined in equation (1) indicating that input 
demand can not exceed the initial input endowment: ( ) ≤g x X . 
5 Assuming continuity of ( ),π p w , the FOC’s having ( )∗ =xp q x wi  , and the Hessian, ( )∗xH x is negative 
definite. 
6 Various forms refers to any differencing, lagging, squaring , interactions, etc. of a variable. 
7 Note equation (3) includes an intercept in parenthesis to indicate that the model may or may not include an 
estimate for the intercept. 
8 
 
  
 
t t
Base CPI
real price current price
Current CPI
 =  
 
 
9 Averages are taken between beginning year and end year values. 
10 The log of average herd size was chosen because dairy farms traditionally incur larger profits with larger herds, 
but displays diminishing marginal returns with regard to herd size. 
11 Any bonuses associated with a given year are allocated to management as it is unknown if equity or labor should 
receive a portion of these bonuses.   Bonuses could be attributed to good or bad weather years or other unobservable 
factors. 
12 $259*413 cows = $106,967/2.5 years = $42,787.  The 2.5 years is the average operator labor months per farm 
which is 30 months. 
13 (-$2,685+$782+$149) + $346*ln(413 cows) = $330.  The $782 and $149 are the average yearly firm and time 
fixed effects values. 
14 A random coefficients model that only includes a random component related to the constant term is also 
considered a random effects model.  See Greene 2003.  
15 The likelihood ratio test when compared to the null model is evaluated as a chi-squared test with 3 degrees, and 2 
degrees of freedom for the random intercept model. 
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Tables 
Table 1.  Pooled Variable Summary Statistics and Definitions New York Dairies 
1999-2008 (Farms = 230, N = 1,165) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition 
nfipcow $564 $549 Net farm income per cow in 2008 dollars. 
equitypcow  $6,038 $3,016  Equity per cow in 2008 dollars. 
oplaborcow 0.159 0.138 Operator labor in months per cow. 
logcow 5.582 0.971 
 
Natural logarithm of average yearly total 
cows. 
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Table 2.  Parameter Estimates for Two-way and Cross Section Fixed Effects (FE) 
Panel Models of 230 New York Dairy Farms, 1999-2008.  (N=1,165) 
 Two-way FE Cross-Section FE  
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept -2,684.76*** 
(619.2) 
-4.34 
 
-2,079.27*** 
(718.6) 
-2.89 
 
equitypcow  0.06108*** 
(0.0134) 
4.56 
  
0.077911*** 
(0.0156) 
5.00 
 
oplaborcow 259.182 
(361.9) 
0.72 
 
13.63315 
(480.2) 
0.03 
 
logcow 345.5163*** 
(96.6115) 
3.58 
 
182.3042* 
(105.2) 
1.73 
 
Firm Effects -417 to 1,771 
(N/A) 
134 sign.† -299 to 2,144 
(N/A) 
172 sign.† 
Year 1999 460.7794*** 
(65.4157) 
7.04 
 
  
Year 2000 76.91896 
(63.8133) 
1.21 
 
  
Year 2001 345.656*** 
(60.5054) 
5.71 
 
  
Year 2002 -136.828** 
(58.2659) 
-2.35 
 
  
Year 2003 -178.878*** 
(57.3099) 
-3.12 
 
  
Year 2004 322.5802*** 
(53.9819) 
5.98 
 
  
Year 2005 137.3242*** 
(49.3397) 
2.78 
 
  
Year 2006 -332.011*** 
(47.9693) 
-6.92 
 
  
Year 2007 649.05*** 
(43.4967) 
14.92 
 
  
F-stat. no fixed effects  
R2                                  
8.18*** 
0.6976 
 2.55*** 
0..4220 
 
Adjusted R2 0.6186  0.2781  
a Note that *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
b Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
† Statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 3.  Parameter Estimates for Random Coefficient Models of 230 New York 
Dairy Farms, 1999-2008.  (N=1,165) 
 Random Int. and Logcow  Random Int. and Logcow  
Variable Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept -778.47*** 
(273.03) 
-2.85 
 
-690.14*** 
(262.98) 
-2.62 
 
equitypcow  0.04878*** 
(0.007042) 
6.93 
 
0.04523*** 
(0.006937) 
6.52 
  
oplaborcow 322.74 
(261.79) 
1.23 
 
230.94 
(244.78) 
0.94 
 
logcow 166.59*** 
(40.9843) 
4.06 
 
153.2*** 
(38.9652) 
3.93 
 
Year 1999 313.63*** 
(49.5524) 
6.33 
 
330.11*** 
(49.5572) 
6.66 
 
Year 2000 -57.3386 
(48.7859) 
-1.18 
 
-41.8213 
(48.7737) 
-0.86 
 
Year 2001 234.36*** 
(49.1819) 
5.03 
 
247.93*** 
(49.3315) 
5.03 
 
Year 2002 -237.5*** 
(49.119) 
-4.84 
 
-226.49*** 
(49.2836) 
-4.6 
 
Year 2003 -261.94*** 
(49.4937) 
-5.29 
 
-256.55*** 
(49.6824) 
-5.16 
 
Year 2004 257.94*** 
(48.0794) 
5.36 
 
262.18*** 
(48.2987) 
5.43 
 
Year 2005 99.1028** 
(45.8224) 
2.16 
 
105.71** 
(46.0762) 
2.29 
 
Year 2006 -351.75*** 
(45.3962) 
-7.75 
 
-349.02*** 
(47.9693) 
-7.64 
 
Year 2007 643.27*** 
(42.8268) 
15.02 
 
642.64*** 
(43.1283) 
14.9 
 
-2 Res. Log Likelihood 17,101.5  17,121.2  
a Note that *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. 
b Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Appendix I. Histograms of Pooled Data:  230 New York Dairy Farms 1999-2008 
(N=1,165). 
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Figure 1.  Dist. of nfipcow    Figure 2.  Dist. of equitypcow 
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Figure 3.  Dist. of oplaborcow                       Figure 4.  Dist. of logcow 
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Appendix II: Histograms of Parameter Estimates:  230 New York Dairy Farms 
1999-2008 (N=1,165). 
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Figure 1.  Dist. of Firm Effects 2-Way   Figure 2.  Dist. of Firm Effects 1-Way  
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Figure 3.  Dist. of Firm Effects    
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Figure 4.  Dist. of Firm Effects          Figure 5.  Dist. of Herd Size Effects   
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